The Impact of Class Actions
on Rule 10b-5
Securities law literature largely ignores the role of the class action
device' in the recent expansion of liability under section 10(b) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act and SEC rule lOb-5. 2 Indeed, both courts
and commentators maintain a dichotomy between the "substantive"
considerations of lOb-5 and the "procedural" considerations of rule 23.3
Commentators, of course, argue that increased use of class actions in the
lOb-5 setting is likely to enhance the effectiveness of the rule in forcing
disclosure. 4 But these observations do not depend on the possibility that
the use of class actions will prompt changes in the substantive requirements of a lOb-5 cause of action. They assume instead that no change
in substantive law will result from the introduction of the class action
device.

5

This comment examines, in the context of disclosure rules, the
proposition that any judgment of the propriety of maintenance of a
class action necessarily entails a definition of the elements of a cause of
action. If this necessity is not explicitly recognized, the unfortunate
consequence may be a failure to consider fully the merits of a change in
1 FED. R. Crv. P. 23 [hereinafter cited as rule 23].
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964); SEC Rule lOb-5,
17 CY.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as lOb-5].
3 For a thorough procedural analysis of rule 23 with no attention to substantive law
considerations, see Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAav. L. REv. 356 (1967), and Wright,
Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169 (1969). Similarly, commentaries on lob-5 give little consideration to the effects of class actions. See A. BROMBERG, SEcanmEs LAw: FRAuD-SEC RULE
lOb-5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG], and 6 L. Loss, SEcUMTrrEs REGULATION 3940.
69 (3d ed. Supp. 1969). Commentators examining lob-5 class actions have concentrated exclusively on their procedural dfficulties. See Bernfeld, Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 78 (1969); Leader, Threshold Prerequisitesto Securities Fraud
Class Actions, 48 TExAs L. Rr v. 417 (1970); Comment, Class Action Treatment of Securities
Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 G~o. WAsH. L. Rzv. 1150 (1968). But see Note,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:Rule 23, The Class Action Device and Its Utilization,
22 U. FLA. L. REv. 631, 644 (1970).
4 See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SEcumrIs REGULATION 1819 (2d ed. 1961).
5 The "Act Empowering the Supreme Court of the United States to Prescribe Rules"

provides in part: "Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant." The Act of June 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), as amended 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. IV, 1969). Also, see Advisory Committee Note, Proposed Rules of

Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1968).
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substantive requirements. In the securities law field, where pressures
for the maintenance of class actions are particularly strong, the dangers
of ill-considered change of substantive law are acute and counsel careful
examination of the implications of expansion of lOb-5 liability.
1.

THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CLAss ACTION DEVICE

Hall v. Coburn Corp.," a consumer class action in the New York
Court of Appeals, illustrates the relationship between class actions and
changes in substantive law. A large number of buyers entered into
retail installment contracts for carpeting with different sellers. Suing
as a class, the buyers alleged that material parts of the contracts were
printed in smaller than eight-point type, the minimum size required by
statute. The action was brought against a finance company, the assignee
and printer of the contracts. Each plaintiff sought recovery of the credit
7
service charge.
Plaintiffs' decision to base the claim on print size, a theory of statutory liability per se, probably was motivated by two considerations.
First, if they had brought the action against all sellers on the terms of
the contracts, on a theory of unconscionability or common law fraud,
they would have been subject to the defense that the question presented
was not "one of a common or general interest of many persons."'8 Each
contract had different terms and contractual parties. Second, the credit
charge in the contracts was authorized by New York law. 9
Affirming the trial court dismissal of the case, the court of appeals
interpreted prior class action case law as requiring "something more"
than identical facts and found that class actions were permissible only
in those cases involving "closely associated relationships growing out of
trust, partnership or joint venture, and ownership of corporate stock."10
Moreover, the court rejected the theory based on the print size of the
contract type, admittedly a technical statutory violation, finding that it
did not strike at the "real evil" of retail credit buying-the amount of
credit service charge.1 1 Finally, the court felt there were other remedies
available to the class, such as administrative action by the newly
2
created State Consumer Protection Board.'
6 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
7 N.Y. PERs. PRoP. LAW §§ 402, 414(2).
8 N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAw § 1005(a) reads in relevant part: "When allowed. Where the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons or where the persons who

might be made parties are very numerous . . .one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all."

9 N.Y. PrEs. PRoP. LAW § 404.
10 26 N.Y.2d at 402, 259 N.E.2d at 722, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
11 Id. at 402-03, 259 N.E.2d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
12 N.Y. Exac. LAw § 553.
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The result in Hall does not seem compelled by prior class action case
law. The court, instead of imposing an additional requirement that the
case involve trust, partnership or joint venture, or ownership of stock,
could easily have held that class actions were available where there were
identical facts. 13 Further, it is clear that individuals have successfully
maintained actions under the same statutory liability theory advanced
in Hall.14 As for the alternate remedies, the statute expressly authorizes
a private right of action, 15 and one of the powers of the State Consumer
Protection Board is to cooperate with and assist consumer class actions
in proper cases. 16 What then explains the result?
The court was evidently unwilling to allow a "technicality" to be
used in a class action where it would produce large damages and have
the effect of broadly undermining existing legislative policy regarding
legitimate credit charges. Although identical facts had been pleadedthe print size was identical and common to all of the contracts-the
court considered these facts, when alleged in a class action, an improper
basis for liability.
The Hall analysis can be compared profitably with the approach of
the Sixth Circuit in Mader v. Armel.17 There, owners of stock in Certi13 The court might have relied on Guffanti v. National Surety Co., 196 N.Y. 452, 90
N.E. 74 (1909) (Crane, J.), where a class action on behalf of depositors for foreign remittance was allowed against the surety of a defaulting bondholder. Judge Crane relied
heavily on PoMERoy, EQUITY JuRsPRuDNC E § 269 (3d ed. 1905), quoting as follows:
Under the greatest diversity of circumstances, and the greatest variety of claims
arising from unauthorized public acts, private tortious acts, invasion of property
rights, violation of contract obligations, and notwithstanding the positive denials
by some American courts, the weight of authority is simply overwhelming that
the jurisdiction may and should be exercised either on behalof a numerous

body, although there is no "common title" nor "community of right" or of "interest in the subject matter" among these individuals but where there is and because there is merely a community of interest among them in the question
of law
q
controversy ....
and fact involved in the general
196 N.Y. at 458, 90 N.E. at 176 (emphasis added). In Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18
N.Y.2d 528, 534, 223 N.E.2d 869, 873, 377 N.Y.S.2d 277, 882 (1966) (Fuld, J.) (class action
by limited partners against general partners to recover damages for waste and mismanagement), the court relied on Guffanti, among other cases, in characterizing the test as one of
"common or general interest." The Hall test, limiting class actions to certain enumerated
situations, is difficult to justify on the assumption that only these situations provide for a
"common or general interest." Indeed, the "common or general interest" may have been
stronger in Hall than in Lichtyger. Compare Lichtyger, 18 N.Y.2d at 536 n2, 223 NX.E2d
at 874, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 384, with Korn v. Franchard Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,845

(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
14 Ben Constr. Corp. v. Rivers, 29 App. Div. 2d 1048, 289 N.YS.2d 866 (1968);
Gramatan Co. v. Jones, 23 App. Div. 2d 940, 260 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1965) (by implication);
Ben Constr. Corp. v. Snushall, 44 Misc. 2d 878, 880-81, 254 N.Y.S2d 948, 950 (Sup. Ct.

1964).
15 N.Y. PrM. PRop. LAw § 414(2) expressly grants a buyer a private right of action
against any person who fails to comply with § 404 which fixes the print size required.
16 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 553(3)(c).
17 402 F2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 US. 930 (1969).
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fled Mortgage Corporation, the target of a successful merger, brought a
lOb-5 class action against the officers and directors of Certified to recover
the decrease in the value of their stock allegedly resulting from the
merger. Plaintiffs claimed that the merger had been accomplished by
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts in proxy statements.
The district judge originally ordered 18 the case to proceed as a class
suit as required by rule 23.19 Later, however, he found that the merger
did not involve a sale within the meaning of rule lOb-5 and granted
defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. In ordering
dismissal, the court indicated that if the case had proceeded to trial the
ruling maintaining the class action would have been vacated, in part,
because each member of plaintiff class would have had to prove his
reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded
in a two-part opinion. First, the court held that a merger does constitute
a sale within the meaning of rule lOb-5. Second, it held that the suit had
properly been maintained as a class action.
Defendants' objection to the propriety of the class action was that
questions of fact and law were not common to the class.20 They contended that not all of the shareholders might have relied on the misrepresentations, suggesting that some might have signed the proxies
without reading the proxy statements, while others might not even have
signed them.
The court of appeals responded to this argument by questioning the
reliance requirement itself. It distinguished the case relied upon by the
district court, List v. Fashion Park, Inc.,21 stating that "List was not a
class action suit. It involved only one plaintiff." 22 It went on to decide
that actual reliance on the misrepresentation was not required. It was
sufficient that plaintiffs presumably had relied on the honesty and fair
dealing of the company when they purchased their shares.2 3 Thus, the
court dispensed with defendants' class action objections by presuming,
as a matter of law, that the element of the claim that might give rise to
uncommon questions was present.
In both Hall and Mader the focal point was the necessity for "com18 Id. at 159, 161.
19 FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(a).
20 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) is the section of rule 23 under which lOb-5 actions are
generally brought. See generally 3B MooRE's FmtAx. PAcrxcE 23.45[2] (2d ed. 1969). See
Leader, supra note 3, at 418. Before a suit can be maintained on a class basis, rule 23(b)(3)
requires that the court find "that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.
21 840 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
22 402 F.2d at 162.
23 Id. at 162-63.
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mon questions." In Hall the court was unwilling to allow a class action
even though the strict liability theory presented only common questions.
The court felt that such a theory would undercut legislative policy. In
Mader the court found common questions by changing the List reliance
requirement.
Both cases point out how courts can maintain different requirements
for substantive causes of action in individual and class suits. Hall does
not state that a strict liability theory would be unavailable in an individual action. It is the consequences of allowing the theory in a class
action which bother the court. In Mader the court frankly states that
the List requirement may be good law in individual actions but is not
required in class actions.
However, the analytical approach in the two cases differs substantially.
The Hall court's decision not to allow a class action is based on the
court's judgment on the merits of plaintiffs' claim. The existence of a
valid cause of action and a valid class action pose the same question for
the court. In Mader,however, the issues are viewed separately. Since the
court perceives itself as making a "procedural" ruling on the propriety
of the class action, it seems not to appreciate fully the change it is
making in the reliance requirement. Thus, it does not discuss the ap24
propriateness of the change.
More fundamentally, these two cases reflect different responses to the
pressures of class actions. Although the Hall court recognized that a
wrong had been suffered by a large class of buyers, it considered the
substantive effects of maintenance of a class action, identified its policy
preference, and disposed of the class action accordingly.2 5 The Mader
court, on the other hand, responded to the pressures of a large class of
defrauded investors by asking the procedural question about common
questions and eliminating an element of lOb-5 liability that threatened
the class suit. It is the response of Mader, rather than that of Hall, that
typifies the course of development in the securities law area.
II.

THE CLASS ACTION CATALYST IN lOb-5 EXPANSION

If class actions exert peculiar effects on substantive law, and these effects have not yet been recognized, one would expect to find different
24 The different approaches of the two courts are explained, in part, by the federal
court practice of separating the motion to maintain or dismiss a class action from the
motion to dismiss on the merits. 2 BARnoN & HoLTZOFF § 562, at 89 (Wright ed. Supp.
1969); Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39,
40-42 (1968); Note, Interlocutory Appeal From Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70
COLUM. L. Rxv. 1292 (1970). Even though the Mader court had both issues before it on
appeal, an unusual event in a lOb-5 class action, its opinion treats the two issues separately
as if their resolution were independent.
25 26 N.Y.2d at 404, 259 N.E.2d at 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
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standards in individual and class actions under lOb-5. The necessary
elements of a valid lOb-5 individual claim are readily discerned.2 6 Examination of the status of these same elements in class actions should
reveal any variations and thus the role of the class action device in
transforming the elements of a claim.
A.

Individual Actions Under 10b-5
Reliance is a generally acknowledged element of a 1Ob-5 individual

claim, at least since List v. Fashion Park, Inc.27 In List, plaintiff-seller

of Fashion Park stock alleged a material non-disclosure of an impending
merger and of his buyer's position as a director of Fashion Park. He
claimed the difference between his selling price and the price later offered to minority shareholders of Fashion Park as part of the merger.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint and upheld its finding that plaintiff would have sold his stock
even if he had known that an insider was one of the buyers. As with
causation in tort, the court remarked, reliance is a necessary element of
a 1Ob-5 claim. The appropriate test is "whether the plaintiff would have
been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had
disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."' 28 Later cases approve the List
doctrine.2 9 The reliance requirement seems to be grounded in a notion
of fairness-defendants should not be liable for injuries they did not
26 There is an enormous literature on all aspects of the substantive requirements for
individual actions under lOb-5. A comprehensive bibliography is available in BROMBEG,
supra note 3, at app. h. Of particular value are W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF
INsIDER TRADING (1968); Fleischer, "Federal CorporationLaw": An Assessment, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 1146 (1965); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 423 (1968). The policy
premises of recent developments are best discussed in Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340 (1966). The best up-to-date survey of the cases is found in
De Lancey, Rule 10b-5-A Recent Profile, 25 Bus. LAw. 1355 (1970).
27 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 882 U.S. 811 (1965). See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
JR., SEcURITES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 909-10 (2d ed. 1968). Compare 6 L. Loss,
SEctJuRrIES REGULATION

3876 (3d ed. Supp. 1969) (reliance has generally been required),

with 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1766 (2d ed. 1961) (reliance may be little more than
a formal requirement).
28 340 F.2d at 462. The Second Circuit, relying on REsTATEMENT OF TORTS §
546 (1938), stated: "Thus to the requirement that the individual plaintiff must have acted
upon the fact misrepresented, is added the parallel requirement that a reasonable man
would also have acted upon the fact misrepresented." (Emphasis in original.)
92,712 (2d Cir. 1970); Reyos
29 Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP'.
v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356
& n.16, 357 & n.18 (10th Cir. 1970); City Natl Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S.Ct. 47 (1970); Northwest Paper Corp. v. Thompson, 421 F.2d
187 (9th Cir. 1969); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 486 (6th Cir. 1969); Myzel v.
Fields, 886 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 890 U.S. 951 (1967); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp.,
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causO3 -and on a judgment that the Securities Exchange Act seeks to
protect only those whose conduct would have been affected by the
availability of accurate information.
The affirmative defense of in paridelicto, like reliance, can be dispositive of a IOb-5 action, and a comparison of its status in individual and
class actions is useful.31 The defense prevents recovery by the plaintiff
who thought he was acting on the basis of inside information. It reflects
a reluctance to use the Securities Exchange Act to compensate those
who intended to violate its provisions.
In the leading case of Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,3 2 the Fifth Circuit
characterized the plaintiff as a dupe who believed he was a tippee and
who intended to take wrongful advantage of the tip. The court dismissed the suit, even though the effect of dismissal was to insulate the
tipper-defendant from liability for a material non-disclosure. The court
reasoned that to do otherwise would give the tippee an enforceable
33
warranty that secret information is true.
Judge Godbold, dissenting, felt that the interest in securities law
enforcement overrode the danger that plaintiff would get a windfall
recovery. He also identified an inherent difficulty in administering the
in paridelicto doctrine: "There are problems of deciding when a party's
'badness' is sufficient to warrant the application of in pari delicto which
makes it almost impossible to create an orderly and consistent body of
34
law on the subject."
Transactions with broker-dealers came before a court in Wohi v.
Blairns where the issue was whether a person who buys stock on the
basis of inside information from his broker may recover against the
broker when it turns out that the "inside information" was untrue. The
court adopted the priorities of the Kuehnert majority and refused to
strike the affirmative defense. A new consideration appeared in the
court's reasoning: "[I]t may well be that much of the excessive and
inflationary speculation in securities is attributable to customers seeking
information which they are not entitled to have unless and until it is
361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966); Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 316 F. Supp. 1362,
1366 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (ED. Pa. 1969).
30 Painter, Inside Information: Growing Painsfor the Development of Federal Corpora.
tion Law Under Rule 10-b5, 65 CoLum. L. R v. 1361, 1370-71 (1965).
31 For discussion of the defense, see Note, In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands As
Defenses to Private Suit Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 30 MD. L. REv. 75 (1970); Comment,
Plaintiff's Conduct as a Bar to Recovery Under the Securities Acts: In Pari Delicto, 48
TExAs L. REv. 181 (1969).
32 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
33 Id. at 705.
34 Id. at 706 & n.3 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
35 50 FRMD. 8) (1970).
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freely available to all."'8 6 Speculators, therefore, are particularly subject
37
to this "badness" test under the in pari delicto doctrine.
The recent Second Circuit decision in Pearlsteinv. Scudder & German8 s adopts a contrary position with regard to a broker violation of
Regulation T, which proscribes margin requirements. 39 The defendant's claim, that Pearlstein knew that the requirements were being
violated, was not a bar to recovery. The majority did not rule out, however, a bar to plaintiff's recovery when contributory fault goes beyond
knowledge of the margin requirements to concealment or misstatement
of material facts.40
Another major element of liability in individual lOb-5 actions is the
materiality of the misrepresentation or omission. This requirement is
explicit in the rule.41 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.42 the Second
Circuit restated the definition of materiality it had formulated in
List: "'The basic test of materiality.., is whether a reasonable man
would attach importance [to the omitted or misrepresented fact] ... in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question.' .. .
This, of course, encompasses any fact '... which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock
or securities...' ,,43 This test focuses on a particular fact at a particular
point in time. Materiality "... will depend at any given time upon a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of
the company activity." 44
The last element of liability is the purchase and sale requirement
deriving from the limitation in section 10(b) that actionable fraud be "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 45 The leading
36 Id. at 93.
37 See Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MicaH. L. REv.

1025, 1034 (1934).
38 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Dec.
12, 1970) (No. 1000). But see Friendly, J., dissenting, id. at 1145.
39 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(2) promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1964). This was
joined with another count under § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78g(c) (1964). Both were held actionable.
40 429 F.2d at 1142-43 & nn.9 & 10.
41. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(b): "[It shall be unlawful] [t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading...."
42 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand, SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See R. JENNiNrs & H. MARSH, JR., supra
note 27, at 909-11.
43 401 F.2d at 849.
44

Id.

45

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
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judicial statement of the requirement is Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.,46 a derivative action in which the minority shareholders of Newport, a target company in a merger, sued the directors of both Newport
and Wilport, the acquiring company. The plaintiffs alleged a sale of
stock at a premium by Newport directors to Wilport, misrepresentations
in letters sent to Newport shareholders explaining the acceptance of the
Wilport bid, and the rejection of an alternate offer by a third company.
The court held that since the minority shareholders had neither purchased nor sold securities in connection with the alleged misrepresentations they were not protected by lOb-5. 47
B.

Class Actions and lOb-5: The Erosion of Subjective Inquiry

Reliance, in pari delicto, materiality and purchase and sale take on a
different cast in class actions. At least since the 1966 amendment of
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a class action is to be
maintained, these elements of substantive liability must be funneled
through rule 23's requirement that "questions... common to the members of the class predominate.... ." Given the considerable pressure in
securities law to adopt and foster class actions, there is a tendency, after
viewing the elements of a lOb-5 claim solely in terms of the common
questions proscription, to restrict the operation of any element that
would frustrate commonality and fragment or prevent recovery by the
class. This section examines the operation and effect of this process.
1. Reliance. The most common target of a non-common questions
defense is reliance; defendant simply claims that some members of the
class relied and some did not. Defendant will usually point out a
particular non-relying member of the plaintiff class-often but not always the plaintiff-representative-to substantiate his point about reliance differences. 48
In the preponderance of cases this non-common questions defense has
not been successful. The result of failure to sustain the defense has
been the near elimination of reliance as an element in class actions.
However, few courts explicitly reject the defense with a statement that
reliance is not required. They follow more circuitous paths to this end.
A common device is to postpone the reliance inquiry and treat reli46 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 843 U.S. 956 (1952).
47 It was once thought that this requirement was in demise. E.g., Lowenfels, The Demise
of the Birnbaum Doctrine:A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. Rxv. 268 (1968). However:
"Bloody but unbowed, Birnbaum still stands." Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th
Cir. 1970). For a chronology of its comeback, especially in the Second Circuit, see Herpich
v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805-10 (5th Cir. 1970), and Kellogg, The Inability To Obtain
Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue is Involved, 20 BUrsALo L. REV. 93 (1970).
48

See text at note 73 infra.
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ance as a problem of proof of damages. As the Second Circuit said in
Green v. Wolf, ". . . separate trial can be had on that issue as on
damages." 49 Thus, possible differences in reliance do not defeat the
action. No case adopting this approach has yet completed trial on the
merits and therefore reached the problem of making separate determinations of reliance for each member of the class. However, when
a class numbers in the thousands it is somewhat unrealistic to expect
that each class member will be called into court for the purpose of
determining reliance.
Reliance presents a much more difficult factual inquiry than does
the damage issue.r0 The latter will typically require only some indication of a purchase or sale in the time period of liability-a matter which
can be handled by a master without an adversary process. Reliance, on
the other hand, involves intensive examination of the plaintiff's conduct, background and state of mind. It has been the central issue in
many lOb-5 individual actions.5 1 These considerations make it likely
that deferring the reliance inquiry effectively eliminates the dispositive
effect of reliance.
Some courts, apparently unsure of their footing, simply allow the
problem of reliance to drop from sight unresolved. In Harris v. Palm
Springs Alpine Estates, Inc.,5 2 a suit alleging misrepresentations in con49 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1968). Judge Kaufman went on
to state: "The effective administration of 23(b)(8) will often require the use of the
'sensible' device of split trials," (emphasis added) citing Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 47 (1966). 406 F.2d at 301. However, Frankel's
language was somewhat incorrectly inscribed, for he said, "familiar device of split trials."
Moreover, Judge Frankel failed to inform us of the sources of this "familiarity," especially
with large classes. We still await the appearance of separate reliance trials in Green.
Plaintiffs, apparently not pleased with the prospect, are attempting to steer a new course.
In Green v. Wolf, 50 F.R.D. 220, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), they successfully amended their
complaint. Originally they had claimed to rely on misleading prospectuses. Now, they
claim that cash distributions made to shareholders were in excess of cash actually available, and if they had known this fact, they would not have purchased stock. They thus
seek to convert a claim of misrepresentation to one of non-disclosure, thereby seeking to
minimize the reliance requirement. Many cases have indicated a willingness to follow the
"split trial" method of dealing with reliance. See Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 893-94 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970); Fogel v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cannon v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mersay v. First Republic Corp:, 43 F.RD.
465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
50 See Morris v. Burchard, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,910, at 90,389 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Pollack, J.). However, the district courts have not abandoned hope altogether. The "split
trials" solution was recently adopted in Feder v. Harrington, CCH Fa. SEc. L. REP.
92,903 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
51 Cases cited note 29 supra.
52 329 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1964). It is altogether conceivable that the Harris court
envisioned "split trials" since it relied on Barber v. Tadayasu Abo, 186 F.2d 775 (9th
Cir. 1951), a class action for habeas corpus on behalf of persons held in custody for
deportation to Japan. However, in Barber"separate trial" consisted of affidavits submitted
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nection with investments in a real estate company, the court stated that
possible differences in reliance would not defeat the class action as long
as common questions predominated. But it did not say that individual
members of plaintiff class need not show reliance, nor did it advise
the district court on the efficient disposition of thousands of factual
inquiries regarding reliance.
Another possible treatment of reliance in class actions is to change,
rather than eliminate, the substantive requirement. Thus, a court could
ask whether the "reasonable investor" would have relied. This standard
eliminates the necessity for more than one factual inquiry, since all
plaintiffs are, presumptively, reasonable investors. This formulation of
the reliance element, may, however, be a mark of its demise, for the
new definition is perilously close to the definition of materiality in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 53 If the test of materiality is whether a reasonable man would attach importance to a fact, it is hard to conceive
of a situation where importance would be attached by a reasonable man
but where a reasonable man would not rely. Thus, in Gerstle v. Gamble
Skogmo, Inc.,514 an action under section 14(a) and SEC rule 14a-9, the
court remarked that "if the 'reasonable man' test has been satisfied...
personal reliance can be inferred and reliance by the individual shareholder may be inferred. ' 55 There can be little doubt that this definition
departs significantly from the List test of causation in fact.
Still other courts deal with reliance by finding that it exists a priori.
Thus, in Weisman v. M.C.A., Inc.,55 the court proposed that reliance
exists whenever there is a purchase of stock-which is always. Even if
by the party plaintiff showing the intention of those in custody to renounce their Japanese
citizenship to avoid deportation, hardly a precedent for separate evidentiary hearings in
a lob-5 damage action. Other courts have left us with similarly vague resolutions. See
Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 163 n.20 (6th Cir. 1968) (plaintiffs required to support by
evidence the allegations of their complaint); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F.
Supp. 1333, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("Plaintiffs have stated claims under Rule 10b-5 ....
Determination of liability, what damage, if any, plaintiffs suffered and what remedy is
appropriate, must await trial."); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
53 See text at notes 42-43 supra. It should be noted that the acceptance by the Second
Circuit of the "reasonable investor" test, 401 F.2d at 849, in the SEC action was made
while 49 private actions were pending in the district court, 31 of which were class actions.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 263 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
54 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Although the court was not willing to say reliance
was equivalent to materiality in a lOb-5 action, its reasoning in the proxy context reaches
this result. The court states, "[T]he Court may and does infer from the totality of circumstances reliance . . . predicated upon material misrepresentations in the proxy statement."
Cf. Berman v. Thomson, 45 F.R.D. 342 (N.D. Ill. 1968), and see Comment, Negligent
MisrepresentationsUnder Rule lob-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 824, 842 n.75 (1965).
55 298 F. Supp. at 98.
56 45 F.R.D. 258, 269 (D. Del. 1968). A similar approach was suggested in Mader. See

text at note 23 supra.
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the case involves a sale, there must necessarily have been a prior purchase. The court viewed reliance as characteristic of all holders of stock
in that they rely on the good faith and fair dealing of corporate management.
A similar form of a priori reliance relates to market prices. In Herbst
v. Able57 the court found a material omission of fact and misrepresentations resulting in overstated earnings. Plaintiff class was comprised of
holders of convertible debentures who exercised their conversion rights
during the omission-misrepresentation period. The court reasoned that
since the market price of the stock went up during the omission period,
and since all purchasers (holders of convertible debentures) "presumably" react to increased market prices, there was a fraud on the market
common to all members of the class. Thus, through the heroic assumption that market prices are the sole explanation for purchases, the court
neutralized differences in reliance. Other courts reason similarly to
achieve the same result.58
A few courts have yielded to the common question dilemma by stating that reliance is not a necessary element of a cause of action under
lOb-5. Thus, in Kahan v. Rosenstiel,59 a suit for attorney's fees, the
Third Circuit had to decide whether a mooted class action in which
Kahan had been counsel had stated a meritorious cause of action. The
court stated that "proof of reliance is not an independent element
which must be alleged to establish a cause of action," 60 because it would
make recovery for the class difficult and because any material defect in
a statement carries with it the implication that a "reasonable shareholder" had relied.6 1
The tide may be turning toward express elimination of reliance with
the Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 62 In
47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Judge Weinstein did not rule out this result in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,
488-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). A variant of this approach is indicated in Esplin v. Hirschi, 402
F.2d 94, 100-01 (10th Cir. 1968), where the court states: "Investors did not rely upon oral
misrepresentations at all, or for that matter upon any affirmative misrepresentations, but
upon a complete failure to disclose any material facts-which default was necessarily
common to all shareholders." This formula demonstrates the semantic ease with which
any case involving a misrepresentation can be converted to a non-disclosure case. See
Green v. Wolf, 50 F.R.D. 220, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and note 49 supra. But see Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
822 (1970).
59 424 F.2d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1970) (Adams, J.), rev'g 300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Del. 1969),
57
68

cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
60 Id. at 173.

61 Id. at 174. In reaching this result the Third Circuit partially relied on Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), and sought to apply the reasoning in that
case, see text at notes 62-70 infra, to the lOb-5 area.
62 396 US. 375 (1970) (Harlan, J.), rev'g 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'g 281 F. Supp.
826 (N.D. IM.1967).
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Mills plaintiffs sued derivatively and as a class of minority shareholders
to set aside a merger, alleging a failure by Auto-Lite's directors to disclose in a proxy statement recommending the merger that they were
under the control and domination of the acquiring company. The suit
was grounded on section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC rule 14a-9.P3
The district court,64 ruling on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
decided that there was a material omission, but that a hearing would
have to be held to determine whether there was a causal connection
between the omission and the injury. After the hearing, the court held
that since the votes of minority shareholders were necessary to approve
the merger, the requisite causal relationship had been shown. The
court of appeals reversed on the causation point, explaining that the
test of causation was the same as the test of reliance-whether the in66
5
jured parties relied on the misrepresentation. However, "rightly"
concluding that it would be impossible to determine the reliance of
thousands of individuals, the Seventh Circuit adopted another test:
plaintiffs would prevail unless defendants could show that the merger
was fair.67 Justice Harlan's opinion for the Supreme Court rejected this
fairness approach,68 holding instead that where "the proxy solicitation
itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was
an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction," 69 reliance
need not be established.
Mills clearly does not dispose of the reliance question in lOb-5 actions.
At least three circuit courts have referred to reliance as a necessary
element in a claim since Mills-in individual actions. 70 But, faced with
63 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1970).
64 281 F. Supp. at 830-31.
O5 403 F.2d at 436 & n.10.

60 This is Justice Harlan's characterization of the Seventh Circuit's conclusion. He also
notes, 396 U.S. at 382 n.5, that "[p]roof of actual reliance by thousands of investors would,
as the court acknowledged, not be feasible," citing R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., supra
note 27, at 1001.
67 396 U.S. at 880; 403 F.2d at 435-36.
68 Id. at 386. The Court dismissed List v. Fashion Park with a brief "cf." Id. at 384 n.6.
69 For what the "essential link" holding may mean see Note, Causation and Liability
in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107 (1970). Unhappily, the Note
attributes no special importance to the fact that Mills was a class action. Mills has been
cited with approval in a proxy case class action brought under both lOb-5 and 14(a).
Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REp.
92,864 (D. Del.
1970) (Wright, C.J.), but Judge Wright rested his decision only on the count under 14(a),
stating that under Mills this section was more favorable to plaintiffs' case. But see discussion of Kahan in text at notes 59-61 supra.
70 City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 231 (8th Cir. 1970), puts an interesting

twist on the requirement. It first adopts the "reasonable investor" test but then reintroduces the individual plaintiff by looking at his characteristics to see if he is reasonable.
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 n.15 (10th Cir. 1970), dismisses Mills with a brief "cf."

Also, see Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
1970), which gives Mills a "see also" after relying on List.

92,712, at 99,137 (2d Cir.
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"thousands of investors" who may or may not have relied, all three
courts in Mills accommodated the class by restricting the reliance element. The same problem of determining reliance by each of the "thousands of investors" in a class suit must be resolved under lOb-5. Indeed,
the reliance cases so far reviewed indicate that 1Ob-5 law is fast approaching the Mills result.
The attenuation or abolition of reliance is not, however, unambiguous. Some courts have dismissed class actions because questions of
reliance were not common to the class; the reasoning in these cases is
of some interest.
In Berger v. PurolatorProducts, Inc.7 1 the court approved dismissal
of two class actions that had been settled by the plaintiff-representative.
In determining under rule 23 whether the settlement was fair to the
class and, thus, whether the actions were properly dismissed, the court
noted, citing List, that differences in reliance made plaintiffs' success
unlikely. This was a better prediction in 1966 than it would be in 1971.
Also, since it is unclear what happens if the court does not approve a
settlement, 72 the court may have been anxious merely to state a basis
for approving it.
In Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc.j3 the defendants
themselves were in the plaintiff classl They had simultaneously purchased securities and induced the purchase of others by fraud. Thus,
absent a reliance element, defendants might recover from themselves.
This anomaly is not unusual, though it is rarely presented so starkly. If
reliance is abolished, some who did not rely will recover; if reliance is
retained, either the action must be dismissed for non-common questions
or great time and resources must be spent to ascertain its existence.
Faced with these undisguised facts, Kronenberg avoided the anomaly
by preserving the reliance requirement for the purpose of proving
damages. Defendants could be excluded from recovery at that time.
Other courts, apparently unimpressed with the anomaly, have restricted
reliance when the alternative would have been dismissal or separate
investigation.
The only recent case to dismiss a class action because of possible differences in reliance among the members of the class is Hirsch v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.7 4 This action, part of the extensive
41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
72 See Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivision (d), 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 497, 592 n.43 (1969).
73 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
74 311 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Jacobs v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 42 F.R.D.
595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), reaches the same result on similar facts.
71
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Douglas Aircraft litigation,75 was brought on behalf of those purchasing
Douglas stock between June 20 and June 24, the period during which.
Douglas left an inaccurate earnings statement in force. Plaintiff, however, did not sell until six months after Douglas issued a corrective release. The court held that the late sale indicated that plaintiff's loss had
not been caused in fact by the misrepresentations." The party-plaintiff
was apparently seeking to take advantage of the misrepresentation to
recoup losses attributable to a general down swing in the market. As in
Kronenberg, the facts were hard; but the Hirsch court adopted a harsher
alternative than the exclusion solution of Kronenberg: it dismissed the
77
action, denying relief to the entire class.
A final case presents a stronger challenge to the elimination of reliance and threatens the continued use of class actions under lOb-5. In
Korn v. FranchardCorp.78 a class of 1,000 investors in a real estate venture alleged a misrepresentation in a 1961 prospectus describing the
terms of their investment in a real estate syndicate. Judge Mansfield had
previously maintained the action on a class basis, but only conditionally,79 pending the return by members of the class of proof of claim
forms.8 0 The forms were designed to ascertain whether the members of
75 See Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
76 311 F. Supp. at 1289.
77 Id. at 1290.
92,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Mansfield, J.).
78 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79 Courts may maintain class actions on a conditional basis. See Dolgow v. Anderson,
43 F.R.D. 472, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Leader, supra note 3, at 422-23; Wright, supra note
3, at 181-82.
80 Judge Mansfield stated that the proof of claim form procedure "has gained favor in
similar class suits." The cases used by the court to support this proposition are, however,
less than controlling. Three of them involved antitrust claims made by governmental
entities in which the proof of claim form was restricted to proof of damages, e.g., purchases and prices. See Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn.
1968) (objective facts relating to purchases); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 391, 404 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (indicate in writing intent to submit claims); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462, 464 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(proof of damages). The weakness of the antitrust cases as precedent lies in the difference
between the forms employed there, and the one in Korn, which asked a substantive question--did you rely on the misrepresentation? Moreover, the attentiveness of governmental
bodies, whose individual claims might amount to thousands of dollars and whose recordkeeping procedures allow easy recall of information, differs substantially from the lack of
interest likely where a ten dollar investor is involved. The one reported securities case
relied on by the court is Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966), which required a pretrial processing of proof of claim forms before the action could be maintained on a class
basis and submitted substantive questions in regard to reliance on misrepresentations.
Id. at 73. However, the court recognized that this might be in conflict with the provisions
of rule 23. Id. at 75 n.10. The case had not been cited favorably until Korn.
The proof of claim form procedure bears a strong resemblance to earlier attempts to
have "evidentiary hearings" on the merits before the action could proceed on a class basis.
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 502 (E.D.N.Y 1968). For later cases disapproving of

352

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:337

the class were favorably disposed to the suit and whether they had
relied on the alleged misrepresentations."' Upon return of the forms,

defendants' motion for dismissal under rule 23(c)(1) was granted, in
part, because of the results of the form.8 2
The returned forms showed that the class was apathetic to the
action.88 Further, a "substantial number" stated that they did not rely
on the prospectus though the form "was an invitation to so state;""-,
and eighty per cent of the class would not state "even in the most
general terms what if anything was misstated." 85 Finally, many investors
indicated that they had relied on the advice of other people in making
their investment.

The court offered an explanation for the apathy. Six months after
the initiation of the suit, the defendant corporation had liquidated and
distributed to its investors $4,570 for each $5,000 investment unit. The
lawsuit was mentioned in the distribution letter and each distributee
could release Franchard Corporation and its executives from any
claims by signing a statement on the back of the enclosed check. Only
seventy recipients of the checks refused to sign.85 The low rate of rethis approach, including Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 301-02 n.15 (2d Cir. 1968), see
Leader, supra note 3, at" 427-28 & n.68. The grounds of disapproval are redundancy, impermissible modification of summary judgment and denial of plaintiff's right to jury
trial. The latter problem may be of greater importance in light of the "flexible" approach
to the jury trial taken by the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
See Comment, Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Suit, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 697 (1970).
81 50 F.R.D. at 60. Judge Mansfield did not indicate that the answers to the proof of

claim form could lead to dismissal.
82 Reversal also rested on another ground. The court noted that plaintiffs' attorney
might have violated Canons 2, 11 and 28 of the Judicial Ethics, ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, by stirring up litigation through communication with the class under a
pseudonym letter while the proof of claim form was outstanding. The court rejected any
comparisons between the conduct of plaintiffs' attorney and that of defendants' use of a
release form during the same period. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,616, at 90,169. But see
Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970) (rule 23(e) requires court approval
of settlement). See also Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation: Suggested
Local Rule No. 7-Prevention of Potential Abuses of Class Actions, 49 F.R.D. 217, 229

(1970).
83 Of the 1,000 forms sent out, 36% were undelivered because the persons had
changed their address and had left no forwarding address. The court noted that of the
233 responses returned, 77 had requested exclusion from the class. The only other
empirical evidence attesting to apathy on the part of the class was that 80% to 90% of
those returning the form were unable to state the amount received by them upon sale of
their investment. The validity of these results, in terms of the adequacy of the sampling
technique-or the propriety of basing any judicial decision on the basis of a mail
sample-was not discussed by the court.
84 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,616, at 90,167.
85 Id.
80 Id.
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fusal was evidence, the court felt, that plaintiffs' interests were not
87
typical of the asserted class.
Use of proof of claim forms to determine reliance raises several
problems. The forms are necessary only if reliance is preserved as an
element of a 10b-5 claim, yet the very use of the form may transform
reliance into a formal, but significant, obstacle to recovery. Many class
members are not likely to understand the technical notion of reliance.
Moreover, as discussed by Judge Mansfield, there are objections to the
propriety and validity of conducting an evidentiary hearing through
the mail. Mansfield felt that the class action was designed to protect
small investors "unable to articulate their claims with the precision demanded of larger more sophisticated claimants."8 8 He also noted the
inherent difficulties of asking investors with small claims to track down
information to answer questions.8 9
Another alternative, rejected by Mansfield, is exclusion from the
class of those indicating no reliance. If those class members do not
indicate also that they are requesting exclusion from the class, this
alternative may be contrary to rule 23, which requires inclusion in the
class unless exclusion is requested. 9° The same problem would be
encountered in excluding those who fail to file a proof of claim form.91
87 Rule 23(a)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained only if "the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class."
This test is probably equivalent to that of "common questions." See 3B MooRE's FEDERAL
PRAcricE
23.06-2, at 23-325, -326 & nn.5 & 6 (2d ed. 1969).
88 50 F.R.D. at 60.
80 Id. The court states that: "Unless and until liability to the class is established or
seems reasonably certain, therefore, members should not be barred for failure to track
down this information, even though such information might later be a reasonable condition
to their participation in any recovery, assuming liability is established."
90 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3). See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 391-92.
91 Judge Mansfield seemingly took this point of view in the first action, stating: "However, there appears to be a fundamental inconsistency in providing, on the one hand,
that.a member who fails to request exclusion shall be included in the class and, on the
other hand, that a member who fails to file a proof of claim shall be excluded from any
recovery." 50 F.R.D. at 60.
Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
where proof of claim forms were used as the basis of settlement, raises as many problems
as Korn, where the forms were used to justify dismissal of the action. Plaintiff class in
Neuman consisted of approximately 9,000 holders of 900,000 shares (or the debenture
equivalent) of Electronic Specialty. When Electronic Specialty became the target of a
tender offer, the corporate directors recommended that the shareholders reject the offer;
yet on the day the offer was to expire, the officers tendered their shares. Plaintiffs charged
the corporation and its officers with misrepresentations in the communications to the
shareholders in violation of rule lOb-5 and § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act and
claimed as damages the difference between the tender offer ($39) and the price at which
plaintiffs could have or did sell their shares ($33 3/8 the day after the offer expired).
Judge Will upheld the action on a class basis but required each member of the class to
prove reliance. He directed that a letter be sent to the members of the class; the letter
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Furthermore, in any solicitation of a large class, some members will
never receive forms, some members will not return forms and some
included three questions pertaining to reliance:
5. Did you rely on the letter attached hereto [this was the letter in which the defendants urged the shareholders not to tender] in deciding whether or not to tender
your stock or debentures?
6. If you answered yes to Question 5, what, if any, other factors caused you not to
tender your Electronic Specialty Co. stock and debentures to International Controls
Corp.?
7. If you answered no to Question 5, what factors caused you not to tender your
Electronic Specialty Co. stock and debentures to International Controls Corp.?
After 30 days a second letter, indicating that non-respondents would be barred from
recovery, was sent to the entire class.
35% of the members of the class (holders of 453,000 shares) indicated reliance. Another
15% of the class members responded to the questionnaire, with some indicating no
reliance and others (holders of 129,000 shares) opting out of the class. 50% of the class
failed to respond.
The parties entered into settlement negotiations and calculated damages using as a
guideline the number of reliers as revealed by the form. On January 28, 1971, Judge Will
approved the resulting settlement of $1.2' million (of which $240,000 was allocated to
attorney fees). His order restricted participation in the settlement to members of the
class who had indicated reliance. When notice of the settlement was sent out, some class
members, who apparently had never heard of the suit, demanded inclusion as reliers;
others indicated that they had more shares than were shown by the settlement schedule.
Plaintiffs' counsel is nowtamending the schedule on the basis of these adjustments, but
there has been no increase in the gross damage award. This outline of Neuman comes from
an interview with Lowell Sachnoff, Gerald Fishman, and Ron Grais, of Sachnoff, Schrager,
Jones & Weaver, attorneys for the plaintiffs, Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 9, 1971.
There seem to be four difficulties with the Neuman use of proof of claim forms. First,
there is the Korn problem of conducting a trial investigation through the mail. This
concern is particularly acute in Neuman since the form determines who will participate in
a settlement which binds all members of the class who have not opted out. Class members
probably are not familiar with the meaning in legal parlance of "reliance." Since counsel
may not communicate with the class, or otherwise define the meaning of the term, many
class members who do respond may do so blindly. The result may be as many different
standards of reliance as there are members of the class.
Second, since many respondents to the form used in Neuman gave highly ambiguous or
confused answers, there were difficult problems of classifying responses. This task is more
difficult than in Korn, where the common questions issue required only a rough delineation
of reliers and non-reliers. In Neuman precise delineation was necessary, but there was no
clear categorization of those situations where reliance is present and those where it is
not. For example, does reliance on the advice of a friend who himself relied on the misrepresentation constitute cognizable reliance? Even if there were categories, problems of
determining what the respondent meant to say would remain.
Third, the procedure creates tensions with the opt-out requirement of rule 23(c)(2). That
section provides that a judgment "will include" each class member who has not requested
exclusion. While non-respondents (or non-reliers) to the form have not requested exclusion
and are therefore bound by the settlement, they are excluded from participation in the
,ettlement. This anomaly is aggravated by the consideration that many members of the
class, particularly those whose stock was held in street name, never received the form.
This non-receipt may admittedly be due to understandable practical problems, but it is
difficult to comprehend why the street-name or mobile class member should be disadvan.
taged with regard to settlement. This defect is not cured by recurring to the "best rea.
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members will profess non-reliance. The differences will always, under
Korn, raise a non-common questions issue leading, perhaps, to dismissal.
If reliance remains a meaningful element of a lOb-5 claim, Korn v.
Franchard indicates that class actions will seldom withstand attack.
Nevertheless, the implication is, as in cases where reliance is eroding,
that expanded use of class actions requires the elimination of substantive
elements which demand particularized examination of class members.
One court has recently recognized the inability to maintain reliance
within the context of the class action. The frank opinion of Judge Pollack in Morris v. Burchard2 hopefully portends more open discussion
in future cases of the substantive law choice now facing the courts in
class actions. Plaintiffs had bought allegedly unregistered stock of the
Lynbar Corporation from a group of brokers. In a class action, with a
count under lOb-5, 93 plaintiffs claimed that the Lynbar stock was sold
by means of untrue oral statements of material fact. The case was before
Judge Pollack on a motion to maintain the suit as a class action.
The court began its analysis by observing that the series of oral misrepresentations appeared disconnected and varied with regard to each
member of plaintiff class. This raised the issue of "material variations
in what the purchasers relied on and whether they did rely on any of
' 94
the asserted misrepresentations.
Judge Pollack then rejected the "split trial" solution of the Second
Circuit in Green v. Wolf as a "harrowing experience" that could "transform a litigation into a gigantic burden on the Court's resources beyond
its capacity to manage or effectively control." 95 Judge Pollack then observed,
sonable notice" standard of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 839 U.S.
306 (1950), for that standard is relevant only to binding absent class members, not to
excluding a bound class member from the settlement.
Finally, there is a representation problem when, as is understandable, the results of the
form come to be used as a guideline in settlement negotiations. The damages of nonrespondents are not accounted for in the settlement, and the cause of the non-reliers is
left with no champion. Since a large settlement itself provides generous attorney fees, it
may not be in the interest of the attorneys who have been handling the case to argue
either that the settlement amount should be much larger than is indicated by the number
of reliers or that (for the sake of non-reliers) there is no reliance requirement under lob-5.
The practical opportunity for absent class members to intervene is limited, and the
court is unlikely to provide protection for these groups if it has been instrumental in
establishing the challenged use of forms.
92 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,910 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
93 Another count, which was stated under § 5 of the 1933 Act, pertaining to sale
of unregistered securities, was upheld within the class action context. See note 120 infra.
94 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,910, at 90,889.
95 Id. Judge Pollack has been active in attempting to improve the efficiency of the
courts in handling their workloads. See Pollack, PretrialConferences, Judicial ConferenceEighth Circuit, 50 F.R.D. 427, 467 (1970).
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The practical possibility then, is that the use of the procedural
remedy of a class suit might provide an administrative need,
if not incentive to erode and impair observance of the substantive law requirements for compensable claims under the
Securities Laws. 96
Characterizing potential lOb-5 claimants as speculators disappointed
by market conditions, the court dismissed the count under lOb-5.
2. In Pari Delicto. Due to the relatively recent development of this
defense, it appears in only a few class actions. Within the framework of
common questions, the defense arises through a challenge by defendant
that some members of the plaintiff class are in pari delicto and others
are not. Like reliance, this defense can be used to undercut commonality; it requires detailed factual investigation of the conduct and state of
mind of each class member. Two restrictions on defendant's ability to
assert the defense in class actions have already been developed: postponement of the issue to the damage stage and redefinition of the defense.
In Mersay v. First Republic Corp.,97 an action concerning alleged
misrepresentations in registration statements, prospectuses and other
communications issued by First Republic, defendant argued that Mersay's claim was not typical of the class.98 Defendant claimed that
Mersay's close association with defendants prior to and after the formation of First Republic made him an insider, thus disqualifying him as
a representative of the class of innocent shareholders. 9 The court
reasoned that this defense related only to Mersay's ability to recover
damages, stating that "Mersay's status as an insider may defeat his individual claim, just as other claimants' right to recover may be defeated
by other defenses."' 100
Postponement of an affirmative defense to the damage stage does not
present the same difficulties as does postponement of an element which
plaintiff must prove. Conceivably, defendant could easily identify individual members of plaintiff class who are in pari delicto and then offer
proof to preclude their recovery. This is a likely strategy if a particular
class member has large damages-if he bought or sold a big block of
shares. Such a strategy requires only a limited number of factual inquiries. On the other hand, if defendant asserts the defense on a wide
96 CCH FmD. SEc. L. REP.
92,910, at 90,389 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Judge Pollack also noted
the problem of multiple jury trials, citing Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198, 200 (S.D.
Ohio 1970).
97 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
98 Id. at 467. See note 87 supra.
99 43 F.R.D. at 468.

100 Id.
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scale, individual inquiries could proliferate, raising problems similar to
those created by postponement of the reliance question.
In pari delicto has also undergone redefinition in class actions. In
Carpenterv. Hall'01 a trustee in bankruptcy brought a class and derivative action on behalf of those who had sustained a loss resulting from
purchases of or loans against the common stock of the debtor corporation. 10 2 The losses occurred allegedly as a result of misrepresentations by
a class of 93 defendants. Defendant representative claimed that the plain0
tiff corporation was in pari delicto and thus unqualified to bring suit.

3

The court reasoned, however, that plaintiffs could be barred only if they
were at more than equal fault in the transaction. 10 4 This standard substantially limits the defense as defined in Kuehnert, yet the court engages in none of the policy discussion contained in the Kuehnert
decision. Only rarely could a tippee be at greater fault than a tipper,1 5
so the Carpenterstandard may impose no obstacle at all. In any case, the
effect of Carpenteris to change the substantive requirement and eliminate its consideration at trial on the merits.
8. Materiality. Unlike reliance and in pari delicto, the requirement
that a misrepresentation or omission be material generally does not
provide a basis for differentiating members of a plaintiff class. The
cause of action arises out of some incident of alleged misconduct by
defendant. If that incident is material for one member of the class, it
is material for all members of the class. In these situations, the materiality notion remains strong. 0 6
However, in another setting-where several minor and usually differ101 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (mem.).
102 Id. at 1103. The inclusion of loss on loans is a novel element of damages under
lOb-5.
103 311 F. Supp. at 1106.
104 Id. at 1106. The court cited as support for this proposition Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 146 (1970) (an antitrust class action by muffler
dealers against their parent and other subsidiaries). Justice White, concurring, stated,
"Generally speaking, however, I would deny recovery where plaintiff and defendant
bear substantially equal responsibility for injury resulting to one of them but permit
recovery in favor of the one less responsible where one is more responsible than the
other."
105 Of course there are exceptions. One could extort inside information and be more
at fault. In the normal case, however, fault will be greater for the insider, in possession of
the information, who does not disclose to the public. As Justice Marshall, also concurring,
stated, the test of the Court (Justice Black) was equivalent to a holding "that the
doctrine of in Pari delicto has no place in a treble damage antitrust action." See also
Comment, supra note 31, at 195-97 (plaintiff's conduct should not bar recovery in a class
action).
106 This statement holds true only within given time limits where it is agreed that the
misstatement and omission could be said to affect the market or more generally the
decision of the reasonable investor. Cf. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60
(SD.N.Y. 1969).
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ent misrepresentations or omissions are alleged to constitute a "deceptive device"' 107 or an "artifice to defraud" 0 8-the class action device
facilitates a finding of materiality and thus broadens the incidence of
liability under lOb-5. Green v. Wolf Corp.,10 9 a leading case, is illustrative. Plaintiff class alleged misrepresentations in three prospectuses
issued over more than a year. Each document overstated the amount of
cash available for distribution to shareholders. Defendants argued that
the proposed class-all those who bought stock during the yearcould not be maintained because the content and the materiality of the
various statements differed. The theory was that the first of the misrepresentations may not have been material and, therefore, a member of
plaintiff class who bought before the second, perhaps material, misrepresentation could not recover. The court held, however, that all the
statements were alike in material respects and that even if there were
differences, the series of misstatements constituted a common course of
conduct in a scheme to defraud.
Similarly, in Fischer v. Kletz, 110 where plaintiffs alleged that seven
financial statements over a period of two years grossly overstated earnings, the court likened a series of misrepresentations to standing
dominoes: "[O]ne misrepresentation in a financial statement can cause
subsequent statements to fall into inaccuracy and distortion when considered by themselves or compared with previous statements.""' In
Fischer,plaintiff representatives, who bought at the end of the line of
statements, included in the class earlier buyers to explain fully the
later misrepresentations.
Under the "scheme" approach, a potential plaintiff who bought after
a single misrepresentation that was not itself material can nevertheless
recover by instituting a class action on behalf of those in his situation,
plus others who purchased after subsequent or prior misrepresentations
by defendants. The plaintiff relies on these other misrepresentations to
establish a scheme to defraud a class of investors. Moreover, materiality
is provided by later misrepresentations or the cumulative effect of
several non-material misrepresentations. 112 The common questions ob107 Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), provides: "[It shall be unlawful] [t]o use or
employ.., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors."
108 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), provides: "[It shall be unlawful] [t]o employ
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud ...
109 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
110 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Ill Id. at 381, citing with approval Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 300 (2d Cir. 1968). Cf.
Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
112 There may also be a psychological advantage in directing the court's attention to
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jection that the statements differ fails because all statements are pursuant to the scheme. Thus, the class action device operates in conjunction
with the scheme rubric to impose liability in situations where an individual action could not be successful.
One obstacle to this theory of liability is the possible requirement
that the alleged misrepresentations be alike or standardized. In
Moscarelli v. Stamm113 the plaintiffs alleged churning and margin violations by a defendant brokerage house. The court refused to entertain
the suit on a class basis, arguing that here, unlike Green, the alleged violation related to a series of oral rather than written misstatements. Further, the court stated that it would not permit a scheme theory to
circumvent the requirement that the various statements be similar.
Although oral mispresentations over time provide difficulties for
plaintiffs, 114 the case of the pure oral misrepresentation is not typical.
Moscarelli, for example, involved personal relationships between a
broker and a customer. Broker relationships were also involved in
Morris v. Burchard. Due to the personal level of dealing, there is no
necessity to put information in written form. This will rarely be the
case where oral misrepresentations are made by public companies, for
they will usually be combined with some form of written material.
Nevertheless, "standardization" remains a possible obstacle to class
suits. To avoid it, class action plaintiffs in lOb-5 actions sometimes
adopt a statutory liability per se approach reminiscent of Hall v. Goburn."1 5 This occurs when plaintiffs link a claim under lOb-5 with a
claim under section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act, which establishes per
se liability for a misrepresentation in a prospectus. 116
the plight of the class and away from particularized factors in regard to any one plaintiff.
"Class actions tend to communicate the idea of a 'public wrong' rather than a mere
isolated or individual complaint." Note, supra note 3, at 648.
113 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
114 The court makes the distinction between oral and written statements, as follows:
"Although having some common similarities, these face to face oral misrepresentations are
individualized and susceptible of material variations, particularly in view of the dis.
parities in the financial condition of each member. Such differences are not the type of
variations which are inherent in the garden variety of securities class action." Id. at 462-63.
Since the inception of rule 23, cases involving oral misrepresentations have gone both ways.
6 L. Loss, SEcuarris REGULATION 3947 (3d ed. 1969 Supp.). It would seem that oral misrepresentations should present no more uncommonality than written statements. In both
cases the essential question is the materiality of each or all communications and whether
plaintiff class relied. The distinction between them rests on the unstated assumption that
there is more difference between two or more oral statements than between two or more
written ones, but this seems more a matter of proof than a prima fade case foi uncommonality. See Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. 111. 1969).
115 See text at notes 6-16 supra.
116 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
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Thus, in Weiss v. Tenney1117 plaintiff sued under section 11 and 1Ob-5
on behalf of those who had purchased Tenney stock between 1960-63,
alleging misrepresentations in a prospectus and subsequent written
statements. Plaintiff wanted the best of both worlds-the strict liability
of section 11 and the more liberal damage provisions of lOb-5.1 8 The
court found, in response to a non-common questions defense, that the
section 11 and 1Ob-5 claims should be separate and that the section 11
class should include only those plaintiffs who purchased before "the date
at which the market price of Tenney stock no longer reflected the effect
of the allegedly false registration statement." 119 The court granted leave
to amend to define the class more adequately, tossing the ball back to
the plaintiff. 20 Although this approach raises difficulties in fixing a date
at which prospectus misstatements will no longer have an effect on
stock transactions, it allows plaintiff some latitude for expansion
through strict liability and eliminates the need to show materiality.
One by-product of a broad use of the scheme theory in class actions
may be the expansion of the number of defendants. This may be
necessary when the misrepresentations have been made by different
parties over a long period of time. Plaintiff must, in that case, show some
connection between the defendants if a common course of conduct or
scheme theory is to succeed. An allegation of conspiracy may provide
the necessary connectionY2 1 The most striking use of a scheme-plus117 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). There was also a count under § 17(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (1964).
118 The maximum damages available under § 11 is the initial offering price. 15 US.C.

§ 77k(g) (1964).
319

47 F.R.D. at 289.

120 For a display of confusion by the trial court about what the cutoff point should be,

see id. at 288 n.1. For a variant of plaintiffs' approach in Weiss, see Rosen v. Bergman, 40
F.R.D. 19, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), in which the court granted intervention to a plaintiff suing
on behalf of a class, under § 11, in what was formerly a lOb-5 action. The court notes

that a valid § 11 complaint also states a valid lob-5 action, if fraud is involved-usually
the case. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951). In Morris v.
*Burchard, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,910 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), Judge Pollack upheld a complaint on a count under § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964), which
establishes liability for selling an unregistered security, while dismissing the other count
under lob-S. See text at notes 92-96 supra. The court rejected defendants' argument that
§ 12(l) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964), limited a plaintiff to recovery against his
immediate seller. The court held that the § 5 requirement of privity, "that any person
who offers or sells a security in violation of section 5 ...shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him ... " was satisfied by the allegation of conspiracy
against the twenty-sLx defendants. The rationale of the holding lies in the court's observation that if the scheme and the fact of non-registration were established, plaintiff class
would recover without any necessity for split trials on individual issues, a result not
possible under the lob-5 count without a change in substantive law. One might note,
however, that Judge Pollack's reading of § 5 is not without its own implications for change.
121 The use of this theory is traceable to antitrust precedents. See Weeks v. Bareco Oil
Corp., 125 F.2d 84, 88 (7th Cir. 1941), which held that an illegal conspiracy gives rise to
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conspiracy approach to ease materiality requirements occurred in
Harrisv. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc.122 A class of investors in a
"secured 10% Earnings Program" of the Los Angeles Trust Deed and
Mortgage Exchange sued the company, its officers and 40 groups of
real estate subdividers. The court seems to have relied on a prior action
by the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC v. Los Angeles Trust
Deed & Mortgage Exchange,2 3 in holding that there was a proper
allegation of both a conspiracy linking defendants and a scheme linking
a number of misrepresentations for the purpose of withstanding a
motion to dismiss. Given this holding, differences of materiality of misrepresentations surrounding the sale of securities to the more than 8,000
investors were of no consequence; defendant's common question defense
to the class action was dismissed.
Using the scheme strategy in class actions under lOb-5 helps avoid
problems of matching plaintiffs, time periods, misrepresentations and
defendants. If plaintiff establishes a scheme, all members of the plaintiff
class will have a claim against all defendants, and the materiality of
one statutory cause of action because "many persons may have the identical cause of
action, arising from the same wrong, but varying in scope of damage to each depending
upon the effect of the illegal act upon the individual." See also Pettit v. American Stock
Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (alleged conspiracy between members of the
stock exchange and directors of a corporation as part of a scheme to defraud). Conspiracy
theory has been used in only a few lOb-5 class actions because the usual defendants are a
small group of corporate directors or brokerage firm executives. However, its use does
pose the problem of requisite intent, since within the lOb-5 context, scienter-intent to
defraud-no longer seems required. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1961). For an analysis of the Texas Gulf Sulphur relaxation but opposition to
the change, see Note, Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 CoLm . L. Rxv. 1057 (1969). For approval, see Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule
10b-5, 63 MicH. L. R . 1070, 1079-81 (1965). The issue now is whether lOb-5 reaches
negligent misrepresentations or omissions. See Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in
Actions Under 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. Rr~v. 482, 503 (1970). Although there is little authority on
point, it is arguable that conscious parallelism might suffice as a substitute for intent. See
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), in which
the court sustained a lob-5 complaint against Midwestern, as an aider and abettor to
non-disclosure of inside information by a brokerage firm. The court held that silence and
inaction constituted aiding and abetting. If this is the case, allegation of conspiracy should
offer future avenues for expansion. To the extent that expansion of defendant class
occurs, courts may be faced with the same "thousands of defendants" problem that it
faces with plaintiff classes. While this comment focuses on pressures to change substantive
law requirements applying to plaintiffs, a similar analysis would apply to defendant
classes. The pressures for change are attenuated somewhat by the higher motivation for
defendants to participate, prompted by their potential liability. Moreover, they would.
probably answer "proof of liability forms." However, if one believes that it is not proper
to adjudicate liability through the mail, the proliferation of factual inquiries will still
occur.
122 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964).
123 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal. 1960).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 38:337

particular misstatements need not be shown. 2 4 But the expansion of
lOb-5 liability through class actions based on a scheme to defraud is not
without limitation. A scheme approach necessarily implies a larger class
of plaintiffs, and there may be significant practical and procedural
problems, relating to representation, conflicts among the members of
the class and notice, which limit the effectiveness of this approach.
As the class expands, it inevitably will begin to include persons who
do not agree they have suffered a wrong. In Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin'25 plaintiff brought an action under the Sherman Act 26 on behalf
of all odd-lot investors alleging price fixing on the "differential" (the
added commission for handling odd-lots), against the two firms in this
field. As the district court noted, some members of the class (for instance,
broker-dealers) might not benefit if the complaint were upheld. Due to
an inability to resolve the representation issue and despite the Second
Circuit's holding that this was a proper class action, the case was stalled
for two years in the district court. In a recent opinion explaining the
delay,'- the court voiced its concern about devising intervention procedures to accommodate the diverse interests in plaintiff class.' 28 No
adequate solution to the representation problem seems to have been
worked out in lOb-5 or elsewhere, especially in cases where the relief
cannot be shaped to satisfy dissenting parties. 2 9 The requirement of
rule 23 that "the representative parties ... fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,"' 30 remains an obstacle to expanded
classes.
As the class expands, the probability increases also that members of
the class will disagree over the theory of the case or the remedy to
124 This assumes there is no logical sub-class solution to the problem. Compare Dolgow
v. Anderson, 45 F.R.D. 472, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (misrepresentations must be standardized
but can be handled on a sub-class basis under FE. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4)), not indicating
whether individuals in a sub-class may use the "general scheme" to establish materiality,
with Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (plaintiff not allowed to
maintain sub-classes timed to various omissions because of imperfect match).
125 41 F.R.D. 147 (SD.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d. Cir. 1968).
128

15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, CCH FED.

SEc. L. REp.
92,830 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The court also notes problems with proving reliance. In this case it faced over 100,000 individual determinations.
129 See also Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969) (conflict between
members of class as to whether director of a joint venture should be sued on the non127
128

disclosure of the high rate of interest paid on a loan to finance the operations of the
company). The problem in civil rights cases can be acute. One court has faced the

problem of deciding who speaks for the black community, CORE or the NAACP. See
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 208, 209 (D. Conn. 1969) (involving
a conflict as to whether the desegregation plan should provide for integration of all
school districts or just white districts).
180 FED. R. CrV. P. 23(a)(4).
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request. Certain theories or remedies may benefit some plaintiffs at the
expense of others. In Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.18 1 individual
plaintiffs differed in the proximity of their sale of stock to the infamous
April 12 press release. This led to disagreement among plaintiffs and
their attorneys over the advisability of suing as a class of sellers. Those
who sold near the release might be disadvantaged, from the point of
view of alleging reliance, by being lumped together with those who
sold later. The court allowed attorneys who wanted to proceed on a
class basis to do so, while particular investors could maintain individual
actions by opting out of the class. While this solution allowed objecting
individuals to pursue their own litigation course, this alternative
probably was realistic only for individuals with sufficiently large claims.
The same problem can occur in regard to materiality. Those believing they have a strong case for materiality at a given point in time may
think their claim prejudiced, in terms of exposure to a non-common
questions defense based on materiality, by expansion of the class to
include other dates and misrepresentations. Another example is presented by the situation in Weiss v. Tenney. Those who bought one day
after the prospectus, and thus had a good section 11 claim, might be
prejudiced by the lOb-5 class joinder theory employed in the case.
Finally, as the class expands, the notice requirements, which provide
that class members be informed with the best notice practicable of the
suit and the right to opt out or be bound,1 32 can become a severe
financial burden for plaintiffs. 33 As the court noted in Eisen, if "financial considerations prevent the plaintiff from furnishing individual
notice.., there may prove to be no alternative other than the dismissal
of the class suit."'13 4 If notice costs are prohibitive, plaintiffs may be
forced to redefine the class and thus bring the action within their resources. Redefinition may, however, endanger a scheme-conspiracy
theory. For example, if the Fischer class had to be redefined to include
only those purchasing after a single misrepresentation, the other
131 47 F.R.D. 60, 62 n.-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
132 See generally Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action
Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. R v. 889, 908

(1968).
133 The other principal alternative, having defendants bear part of the notice cost,
would greatly increase the outer limits of expansion. The leading case for this alternative
is Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). But this lead has not been
widely followed. SB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrncE
23.55 (2d ed. 1969). But see Berland v.
Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (Mansfield, J.), for criteria of allocation of costs
between plaintiffs and defendants; accord, Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.RID. 57, 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Mansfield, J.).
134 391 F.2d at 570.
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dominoes would be unavailable and the action might falter on the
materiality requirement.
4. Purchase and Sale. This element of substantive liability seems to
survive intact in lOb-5 class actions. In many cases, the class may be
defined simply as those who bought or sold within a certain period.
Once a material violation of rule lOb-5 is established, individuals can
easily present objective proof of purchase or sale. 18 5 Purchase and sale
is not likely to frustrate commonality under rule 23 because it does not
require a detailed factual inquiry into the conduct or state of mind of
the members of plaintiff class.
There are situations, however, where the court must determine
whether plaintiffs' relationship to a particular transaction constitutes a
purchase or sale. This was the problem in Birnbaum. In such cases the
courts have resolved the issue without differentiating between members
of the class. Thus, in Herpich v. Wallace,18 6 the Fifth Circuit treated
purchase and sale as an element of the standing of the class to bring
suit. The case involved an alleged conspiracy in which Wilder, the
control owner of National American Corporation, sold his control for
a premium to the owners of a group of companies, referred to as the
Arizona Group. Payment, which was effected through a two-step process,
consisted of debentures of one of the Arizona Group's subsidiaries. The
Group then planned to merge National American with the subsidiary,
thus forcing National American (and its shareholders) to assume the
debt which reflected the premium. Plaintiff brought suit both on behalf
of the class of minority shareholders of National American and derivatively against the Arizona Group to enjoin the merger and for damages
already incurred from the alleged scheme to defraud. Since neither the
members of plaintiff class nor the corporate entity had yet sold any
stock in connection with the Arizona Group scheme, the court confronted the question of whether the purchase and sale requirement had
been met.
The court treated the issue as one of standing, and imposed two
requirements grounded in article II113 of the Constitution: (1) plaintiff

must show a personal stake in the controversy, and (2) the interest he
135 Even if the representative sues on behalf of a class, some of whom bought or sold
and some of whom did not, the court can easily, without extended factual inquiry, limit

the class to a group defined by objective facts such as purchase between specific dates.
136 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
137 Id. at 805. U.S. CONsT. art. III restricts federal judicial power to "cases" and
"controversies." At this point the court cited Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 150 (1962). A constitutional reading of lob-5 standing may
have the effect of broadening its scope.
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asserts must be within the zone of interests to be protected by section
10(b) and rule 10b-5. After noting that the objective of section 10(b) is to
afford investors "a reasonable opportunity to make intelligent decisions
regarding their purchases and sales,"'38 the court found that the necessary purchase would occur when the merger was consummated. The
uncompleted merger was viewed as part of a scheme to defraud "in connection with" a purchase and sale. However, the court held that the
class action count in the complaint would not lie because it was the
corporation and not the shareholders which would engage in the statutory sale. On the basis of this distinction, the court determined that
National American, but not the members of the plaintiff class, was
within the zone of interests protected by section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 and
39
therefore entitled to maintain an action.
The significance of the preservation of the purchase and sale requirement lies in its use for determining which types of transactions at what
stage of completion, such as mergers, tender offers or sale of control at
a premium, shall be included within the coverage of lOb-5. This choice
between types of transactions can be made without regard to the conduct or state of mind of individual plaintiffs. Thus, although Herpich
may represent a restriction on class standing where there is a merger
pursuant to sale of control at a premium, the restriction does not arise
out of the difficulties connected with the management of class actions,
nor does it preclude finding other transactions within the scope of the
140
flexible Birnbaum doctrine.
III.

EXPANDED USE OF THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE:
EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Several points emerge from this survey of l0b-5 liability in class
actions. Some substantive inquiries, such as reliance and in pari delicto,
which relate to the conduct or state of mind of plaintiff class members,
have been severely restricted. 14' The new emphasis is on substantive
inquiries which are important in strict liability situations: (1) which
type of situations are within the coverage of lOb-5, governed by the
purchase and sale requirement, and (2) is the alleged misrepresentation
material? Though this development seems not to have affected greatly
138 Id. at 806.
189 Id. at 807.

140 For examples of the flexible use of the purchase and sale doctrine in class actions,
see Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 160 (6th
Cir. 1968); Neuman v. Electronic Specialty, Inc., CCH FED. Smc. L. RF,. 92,591 (N.D. Ill.

1969).
141 As observed in note 121 supra, the same potential exists for substantive requirements
pertaining to defendants.
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liability in individual actions, the impact of the change that has been
occurring in the context of class actions should not be underestimated.
If, as has been maintained throughout, there is considerable friction
between expanded use of class actions and retention of certain substantive requirements, 142 why have the courts favored expansion of class
actions? What explains the "liberal" attitude exemplified by the Tenth
Circuit's holding in Esplin v. HirschiM that any "error should be in
favor of maintaining class actions"?
The first reason seems to be that class actions are designed to conserve
judicial resources by avoiding a multiplicity of suits on the same issue.
The need to limit the judicial workload is well recognized 44 and has
become a prime goal of federal judicial reform. 45
Second, class actions offer compensation without participation to
many investors with small claims. In many cases, courts recognize that
individual actions to impose lOb-5 liability, though meritorious and still
maintainable, would not often be pressed after dismissal of a class
suit. 46 Absent class members-even with notice-often do not know
their rights or do not have enough at stake to justify pursuing the
claim. Thus, a court, though it may recognize that certain plaintiffs
have not relied, are in pari delicto, or have acted on the basis of a nonmaterial misrepresentation, may be unwilling to preclude recovery for
any and all because it feels a few are unworthy.
The third major force for the expansion of class actions is deterrence
of securities fraud. Even without changes in the substantive law, class
actions have long been considered a potentially powerful tool for
achieving the objectives of lOb-5.147 Loosening substantive requirements
serves to increase even more the potential for deterrence of lOb-5 violations. The most striking recent example of the damage potential of class
actions is the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. As Ruder points out, 48
the damages in that case could amount to $390 million if all members
of the selling class were to recover the difference between the price at
which they sold and the top price of the stock. This is $150 million more
142 Contra, Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and
Disclosure Obligations Under Rule lOb-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 809, 814-15 (1968) ("decisions
construing Rule lOb-5 are creating no new substantive law of torts").
143 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968). Accord, Green v. Wolf, 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir.
1968).
144 See generally Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 58 U. Cm. L. RLV. 142 (1970).
145 See Chief Justice Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970,54 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
146 See cases cited in Note, Interlocutory Appeal from Orders Striking Class Action
Allegations, 70 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1292 (1970).
147 See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATIoN 1819 (2d ed. 1961).
148 Ruder, supra note 26.
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than the net worth of the company. 149 The bankruptcy of a corporation,
as a result of high class action damages, is apparently not idle speculation. In Percodaniv. Riker-Maxson Corp. 50o the court ruled that under
rule 23(e) a settlement of $1,800,000 on an initial claim of $12,000,
000 was unfair to the class. The court rejected an argument by defendant corporation that larger damages would result in liquidation of
the corporation, and required defendants to provide proof of the
corporation's inability to pay more than the settlement price. 151
These three pressures favoring class actions can be exerted more
easily since the 1966 liberalization of rule 23. Actions now maintained
on the basis that "common questions" predominate previously were
considered "spurious" and did not carry with them the ability to bind,
favorably or unfavorably, absent class members. This change, which was
considered radical by some,1 52 was not intended to affect substantive
law. 153 Nevertheless, the pressures for class actions, operating through
this liberalized mechanism, may explain in part the singular efforts
of the courts in lOb-5 cases to de-emphasize requirements that call for
individual fact determinations.
As has been pointed out, a "common questions" determination cannot be divorced from the substantive law elements of a claim, such as
reliance. To dismiss a class action for failure to prove reliance would be
directly contrary to the pressures upon the court. To have a separate
trial on reliance is unrealistic, as the Supreme Court recognized in Mills,
since it would result in the very proliferation of judicial work that
class actions are supposed to prevent. Likewise, sub-class treatment of
members with certain different characteristics is not likely to allow
preservation of subjective elements of a claim because the very act of
separation into groups requires scrutiny of the individual members of
the class. Thus two alternatives exist. One is to minimize or eliminate
the element, as the Supreme Court did in Mills. The other is to preserve
the element and dismiss the action as Judge Mansfield did in Korn and
Judge Pollack did in Morris. The consequence, however, of raising the
issue in the procedural context of a rule 23 motion is that the court is
not forced to be very frank about change in the substantive law, and
change may thus occur without adequate consideration of its desir154
ability.
149 Id. at 429.
150 50 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
151 Id. at 478.
152 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcF
23A5(1), at 23-702 (2d ed. 1969).
153 This was the proviso of the Enabling Act. See note 5 supra.
154 Class actions pose for the courts, through the mechanism of common questions,
peculiar strains on judicial decision-making. What a court is doing under the rubric of
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If substantive law is changing as a result of the pressures of conservation of judicial resources, compensation and deterrence, it is important
to see how these pressures are being served by the expansion of lOb-5
liability.
The assertion that class actions conserve judicial resources is open to
serious challenge. Class actions are instituted under lOb-5 in situations
where no, or very few, individuals would bother to bring suit. The
expectation that class actions would save time was premised on the assumption that many individuals would sue separately. This is somewhat
unrealistic, insofar as apathetic individuals with small claims are likely
to be unaware of their rights. Indeed, the unlikely incidence of individual actions is used as an argument to support the compensation
objective. As the tortuous history of Eisenr55 indicates, the management
problems in class actions can consume a great deal of judicial time. 56
Further, the complex nature of the procedural problems can trigger a
series of motions and appeals on these issues long before a court
reaches the merits.
That class actions will increase compensation is similarly problematic.
Consider this startling statement by the premier plaintiffs' class action
attorney, Abraham Pomerantz: "Either inertia (especially in our affluent society), or the often difficult task of gathering up proof of claims,
tends to make the injured class member unwilling or unable to pick up
his share of the recovery effected by the volunteer plaintiff."'1 Thus,
the same apathy that was apparent to Judge Mansfield in the Korn
case reappears with regard to the collection of damages. In securities
cases where a plaintiff class is easily identified and transfer records are
kept, this problem may be circumvented by mailing a check directly to
those who bought or sold between certain dates. 5 s However, where,
common questions is deciding what facts should make a difference. They are presented
with multiple plaintiffs with different factual predicates at the same time. They do not
have the luxury of the "common law tradition" .to take different factual situations in a
series of cases. The necessity to deal with these facts simultaneously puts a high premium
on judicial competence since the effects of one poorly reasoned decision may be significantly
greater than in an individual action. See Justice Black's dissent from the adoption of the
change in rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 272, 274 (1966), where he remarked that the change gave rise
to a danger of one judge having too much power.
155 See text at notes 125-28 supra.
156 There is nothing new in this observation. See 1 Possxaoy, EQurry JURISPRUDENcE
§ 251 (4th ed. 1918), stating: 'inhere must be some common relation, some common
interest, or some common question, or else the decree of a court of equity, and the relief
given by it in the one judicial proceeding could not by any possibility avail to prevent
the multiplicity of suits...."
157 Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1260 (1970) (emphasis added).
158 This was the procedure adopted on remand in Swanson v. American Consumer
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as in Eisen, a large percentage of stock is held in street name or in trust
by a large institution, the problem of identifying persists. Further, as
Judge Mansfield indicated in Korn, where a thousand investors were
involved, individuals in a mobile society are difficult to trace, even if
they can be identified.
Pomerantz suggests an alternative distribution system, based on the
doctrine of cy pres,l5 9 in which damages would be a form of automatic
relief given to that class most similar to the one actually harmed. This
form of relief already may occur in a derivative suit where the shareholders have changed by the time the corporation recovers damages. 160
Conceivably it could be implemented in antitrust cases such as Eisen
by lowering the price-differential on odd-lot commissions for a time
sufficient to cover the damages. The theory would be that a close
identity exists over time between odd-lot purchasers. It is, however,
difficult to imagine an equally satisfactory solution in a Texas Gulf
Sulphur situation. The closest class to the actual sellers is probably the
present shareholders who are, however, indirectly (that is, through the
corporation) defendants. The next best class is probably the public at
large, which might obtain uncollected damages through escheat. This
alternative, however, is far from compensation of the injured class, and
may be a better argument for deterrence than for compensation.
Another reason the class may not be well compensated is that attorney's fees often consume a major portion of any damage award. 01
These fees are substantial whether the case is settled or is fully litigated.
The possibility of large settlements and consequent large attorney's
fees is the basis for the contention of corporate defendants and their
attorneys, that "strike suits" are common; courts, too, have recognized
the danger of strike suits. 16 2 The incentive for strike suits under
lOb-5 will no doubt increase with the relaxation of substantive requirements since plaintiff attorneys will have increased leverage in bargaining situations. Although rule 23(e) seeks to prevent such suits through
judicial approval and notice to the class of any settlement, 163 the
practical problems of implementing these safeguards have not been
Indus., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969). The procedure was explained in an interview with
plaintiff's attorney, Richard Orlikoff, of Orlikoff, Prins, Flamm & Susman, Chicago,
Illinois, Dec. 30, 1970.
159 Pomerantz, supra note 157, at 1260.
160 Those selling their shares before judgment might also benefit if the market is
discounting the value of expected recovery.
161 See Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
H-ARv. L. Rrv. 658, 662-63 (1956).
162 Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936-37 (D. Mass. 1962)

(Wyzanski, J.).
168 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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resolved. It is unclear, for example, whether a court can compel a
named party plaintiff and his attorney to continue an action once they
reach an out-of-court settlement, or whether the class interests would be
protected if.they were so compelled. 164
Moreover, compensation for defrauded investors is often paid, indirectly, by innocent shareholders of the defendant corporation. If the
corporation is a defendant, or if it indemnifies its executives, 1 5 any
recovery will decrease the equity of existing shareholders. If compensation is desirable, it is difficult to see why, especially in a large public
corporation, it should be achieved at the shareholder's expense. 166
The limiting case of this anomaly arises when the corporation is
liquidated because of a damage award. This may be not only unfair to
the shareholders but also extremely uneconomical. Creditors and employees as well as shareholders would be directly affected. Some thought
should be given to the "capitalization" of class action damages by a
judicially created security interest for plaintiff class in the corporation.
This would avoid the harshest feature of class action damages, the
lump sum payment. Existing shareholders could reasonably be expected to favor dilution of their interests over bankruptcy.
The final benefit alleged to result from expanded liability under
lOb-5 is deterrence of securities fraud. This is acknowledged to be the
principal objective of the Act. 67 But the crucial question-which has
never been addressed empirically-is whether and how well the current
state of lOb-5 law serves the deterrence goal.
Given the costs associated with changes in the substantive law evoked
by the class action device and the questionable achievement of the other
two pressures used to justify these changes, it is imperative that the
question of deterrence be examined on a systematic basis.168 It could be
evaluated from a number of perspectives: through the use of market
164 For a description of the settlement process, see Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions, 22 Sw. L.J. 767 (1968), and 23 Sw. L.J. 765 (1969).
165 See Symposium-Insider Indemnification and the Supremacy Clause: The Three
Faces of Fraud, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. (1968).
166 See Note, Punitive Damages in Implied Private Actions for Fraud Under the
Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 646, 658 (1970), which opposes any imposition of
punitive damages for this reason. This consideration should apply equally to "normal"
damages if they are substantial. Judge Friendly, concurring, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d at 867, has indicated his misgivings about the large damages flowing out of such suits.
167 See Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 37.
168 Professor Henry G. Manne has already charted the course for future inquiry. See
H. MANNE, INSDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966), and Insider Trading and the
Law Professors,23 VAND. L. REv. 547 (1970). See also EcoNoMIc PoLICY AND THE REGULATION
OF CORPORATE SEctuRmEs (H. Manne ed. 1969); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to
Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 58 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967).
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data before and after disclosures, 16 9 through an examination of the

Securities and Exchange Commission's ability to detect violations,170
through interviews of corporate managers and their counsel to test their
knowledge of the potential effects of lOb-5 violations,'1 ' and through an
analysis of market institutions which presently facilitate the use of inside information. 72 Until comprehensive analysis of data along these
lines is available, the evolving expansion of liability under lOb-5 class
actions may be both undesirable and unwarranted.
169 See generally Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New
Information, 10 INT'L ECON. R y. 1, 20 (1969) ("instantaneous" absorption of new infornation by market); Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider

Trading, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 35, 52 (1968) ("Insiders tend to buy more often than usual
before large price increases and sell more often than usual before price decreases.").
170 A former Chairman of the SEC, Milton Cohen, apparently believes that the SECs
deterrence is measurable by the shortage of cases, a rather dubious empirical test. See
Cohen, Commentary-Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 19 CATHOLic U.L, RV.
75, 78 (1969) ("Their adherence to the principle (not using inside information] is proven
by the relative shortage of cases dealing with violation of disclosure rules.").
171 Many law firms attempt to "school" their clients in the maze of lOb-5. Interview
with Leo Herzel of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois, Oct. 30, 1970.
172 Manne has raised questions about whether discretionary accounts might provide
an ex-officio information exchange ,and whether there may be a conversion of information
by mutual fund managers to their own use. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, supra note 168, at 584-88.

